A post for DBR staking and governance

deBridge DAO
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Welcome to deBridge Governance! This is the first post on deBridge governance forum, and to kick off community discussions, we’re sharing a potential outline for how DBR staking could work to collect feedback and ideas from the community.

Here’s a general overview of the overall process and how things could work:

  1. How staking works

DBR token holders can stake DBR to participate in governance. There is a cooldown period of unstaking (14 days).

Staked DBR is used to vote on governance posts (similar to how it’s done on Jupiter: https://vote.jup.ag/).

Active stakes generate deBridge points in real-time. During cooldown (unstaking) stakes don’t yield any voting power and don’t yield points.

Points are also accounted for every governance proposal voted on.

Restaking
Staked DBR (as well as other liquid assets approved by the DAO) can be restaked for one of the active validators of deBridge messaging, to provide crypto-economic security guarantees in the form of slashable collateral, and to generate additional points on it. Active restaked DBR yields voting power to its owner.

Unstaking from a validator has a cooldown period as well. It returns the liquid asset to the owner’s balance.

Voting power generated from active staked and restaked DBR is used by the owner to participate in governance voting.

Staking mechanics will also be important for solvers of the deBridge Liquidity Network (DLN), who are competing for cross-chain order flow. Now, competition is open for everyone who has experience in development and running automated inventory management and taking scripts. The fastest solver taking the biggest finality risk is the one winning the order flow.

Solvers have been among the biggest recipients of the initial DBR airdrop, as they paid protocol fees for cross-chain messages that unlock fulfilled orders. With the introduction of staking, the DAO can introduce an onboarding flow for all solvers, and grant solvers an admission to the order flow competition, only if it has at least X of DBR voting power.

  1. Slashing

In the event of a validator fault (e.g. forging of the message or downtime/censorship) governance can vote to pause staking/unstaking for a specific validator (part of the stake that is under cooldown of this validator is paused as well). E.g. If a validator fault happens at “slashing_event_timestamp”, then all stakes queued for unstaking after this timestamp are returned to the active validator’s stake to be part of the slashable collateral.

After pausing staking/unstaking for a specific validator and fixing the total slashable amount, governance can vote on what amount should be slashed (transferred from restaking contract to the DAO treasury). If the DAO vote is positive, the governance multisig then executes a slashing transaction, leading to stakes of all assets restaked for the validator be reduced proportionally to the slashed amount. After slashing, staking/unstaking is unpaused, and all staking/unstaking operations return back to normal.

Users can vote on slashing-related decisions as long as it does not concern the validators they have re-staked to, in this situation, their respective stake is to be excluded from these governance decisions due to conflict of interest.

The governance multisig should also be able to add other assets that can be used for restaking (e.g. jitoSOL). For non-DBR assets, smart contracts will return an LP token that represents ownership over restaked assets. LP tokens enable composability for restaked assets.

  1. Voting power

When users vote on governance posts, the voting contract should calculate the voting power of each address as a sum of:

  1. The total amount of staked DBR

  2. The total amount of restaked (and not paused) DBR for all validators

  3. If that’s a post that is part of the slashing process of N’th validator, deduct restaked DBR for N’th validator from voting power

The final total amount is the voting power of each address participating in governance.

  1. DBR utility

Our goal is to build a thriving ecosystem governed by DBR token holders.

Based on the suggested design for staking, DBR will have the following utilities:

  • Staking DBR to participate in governance
  • Restaking of DBR for deBridge validators to provide crypto-economic security guaranteed for the deBridge messaging

  1. Next steps — gathering feedback

We truly appreciate everyone in the deBridge family, and we hope that our newly launched governance forum can be a place to brainstorm, collaborate, and optimize deBridge.

What do you think of the post?

Please let us know in the replies, we appreciate anyone that gives input on how we can improve it for the benefit of the deBridge ecosystem. Thank you!

4 Likes
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Very clear team but I have a few questions/suggestions regarding the Staking Mechanism

Staking Periods: Is the 14-day cooldown for unstaking appropriate, or should there be a flexible or tiered cooldown period to accommodate different levels of risk tolerance among stakers?
Point Accrual: Should points accrue only for active stakes, or would the community benefit from partial point accrual during the cooldown period to incentivize participation even during unstaking?
Restaking : What criteria should the DAO use when approving assets for restaking beyond DBR? Are there specific asset types the community would like to see considered (e.g., stablecoins, high-liquidity assets)?

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What are the DBR points used for?

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I get the part of the point etc. But is there no earning apy on the staking.

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Mind sharing? Are the points part of a Jupiter ASR style reward at the end of the quarter, is it part of another airdrop, or what? You’re asking if it has a staking apy but say you understand the points which seem like mutually exclusive things.

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Pretty excited about this. LFG :raised_hands:

2 Likes
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Happy to accept anything. My first proposal would be for the money collected in fees in the Treasury to be used to buy DBR , and distributions paid in DBR

1 Like
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I’d just copy how Jupiter handles unstaking with a 30-day cooldown and gradually decrease voting power as unstaking starts. Also, what exactly are “points”? It would be better if the rewards were directly in $DBR instead. Points shouldn’t feel like something “magical” with no value, or you’ll end up with the same FUD that Magic Eden faced with their diamonds or MadLads with their golden coins.

The slashing votes look too complicated for non-technical users to understand, and restaking will also be hard to explain to them. I’d think about adding more utility, like discounted bridging fees for stakers or giving the top 10% of stakers first choice on airdrops from partner projects.

I don’t think voting delegation is necessary; it could overcomplicate things. If you create a fun voting experience like Jupiter does, people will actually enjoy participating, and you’ll get a lot of hype around your project. Each Jupiter vote generates buzz on X, and people love taking part in those votes.

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The tentative idea is that it will be a fixed 14-day cooldown for everyone that’s unstaking. The main idea is that if there is some misbehaviour of validator, everyone who staked liquidity for this validator will try to unstake as soon as possible, to save their stake from slashing. That’s exactly why 14-day cooldown is needed, to pause unstakes and retail all liquidity as a part of slashable collateral.

Do you have some input/ideas on how that flexible/tiered cooldown period would look like? Would be great to hear.

“Point Accrual: Should points accrue only for active stakes, or would the community benefit from partial point accrual during the cooldown period to incentivize participation even during unstaking?”

The tentative thought is that points accrual should only be for active stakers as that incentives users to stake + beneficial for the overall staking framework. Stakes should accrue points whenever it’s part of slashable collateral. Stake passing cooldown period is not slashable (unless there was validator’s misbehavior event that happened before unstake).

“Restaking : What criteria should the DAO use when approving assets for restaking beyond DBR? Are there specific asset types the community would like to see considered (e.g., stablecoins, high-liquidity assets)?”

Any liquid asset that can be converted on-chain into USDC can be used for crypto-economic guarantees. Most popular assets will likely be restaked assets (e.g. jitoSol or jupSol) or LP tokens of lending protocols and liquidity pools, where owners want to get exposure on deBridge ecosystem through deBridge points on top of yield that their asset already generates.

Your question triggered an idea that on the protocol level we can probably allow staking of any arbitrary asset, but accrue points only for those that have sufficient on-chain liquidity or redemption mechanisms.

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The tentative idea is that the accumulated DBR points here for each user/address that’s staking will be accounted for towards future airdrops, similar to what we did with the initial airdrop and the points that people had collected there. In this way, it’s an incentive for users to stake their DBR while getting a % on their staked account depending on the overall amount and time they proceed with the staking.

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Hey Marino!

Unstaking of SOL on Solana takes 1 epoch (2-3 days). Unstaking JUP takes 30-day cooldown. I guess a 15-day cooldown is a good middle ground, as it gives time to retain collateral in case there was any slashing event.

As for points — deBridge has a deBridge points campaign which is some sort of loyalty program that accounts loyalty points for different activities that add value to the ecosystem.

Season 1 of the points campaign concluded with an airdrop, where 6% of the total supply was distributed proportionally to all point owners.

DAO still has 11%+ of the total supply in the “Community and launch part” which is intended to be distributed to the community over the next 3 yeards, through future seasons of the points campaign (Season 2 is live now). So you can think of deBridge points as an analog for Jupiter’s Jupuary.

I’d think about adding more utility, like discounted bridging fees for stakers or giving the top 10% of stakers first choice on airdrops from partner projects.

Users get points accounted for fees paid, so they get exposure on future seasons of the points campaign.

In v2 of deBridge Liquidity Network, we’ll move the ledger off-chain drastically lowering the operational costs, so DAO will be able to impose fees only on solvers while rebating them in the form of DBR. This can also open a room for discount mechanics that you suggested — solvers will provide tighter spreads for users with voting power. DAO can set Tier levels based on 30d volume and voting power — similar to VIP levels that Binance grants depending on volumes and BNB stake.

Your point that delegation is not necessary makes sense too!

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Please see my comment about points here:

You can also read more details about mechanics in the blog posts:

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Hey Alex,

Thanks for your reply!

I think the 15-day cooldown is indeed a good middle ground, similar to Pyth’s two-week unstaking period, which should help retain collateral if there’s ever a slashing event.

Just to confirm, at the end of each season, do points convert directly to $DBR and then reset? Also, is there currently a dynamic allocation checker page where users can track their points in real-time? It would be really helpful if users could understand the value of their points in relation to $DBR as they accumulate—could this be possible?

You mentioned that points are accumulated by users paying fees through protocol usage. I want to confirm—are there two ways to accumulate points: one through regular protocol usage (like paying fees for bridging) and another through staking DBR in a validator? And are these points of the same type and value, or do they differ depending on the activity?

It would also be great to know the season timelines—like when each season starts and ends—so users can plan accordingly.

Lastly, it’s exciting to hear that discounted fees will be possible in V2. Adding this as a utility would really boost the token’s appeal.

Thanks again for all the details!

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Great proposal!

Some thoughts on the points mentioned:

Slashing - While excluding those directly restaked to a validator from voting on its slashing avoids conflict of interest, there needs to be real-time visibility into slashing events and validator statuses, to make sure that the community voting on the slashing penalties has all the information needed to make the correct decision.

Points - The points system could be a good additional feature, but it needs to be well explained and have a clear use case and value for the users. It also needs to be simple enough, to be attractive for users.

Staking economics - Will there be thresholds on commission fees set by the protocol(max or min profitSharingBPS) to ensure healthy network economics and operator behaviors?

Everything considered, the proposed staking and governance model offers a good foundation, and refining it over time could make the DBR’s ecosystem resilient and community-driven.

2 Likes
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That seems to be a very over complicated way to approach staking. Jupiter can get away with delaying rewards, because they’re not charging fees as such to users of their protocol. And it’s the most used dapp on Solana. I hope things are kept much simpler for DBR staking.
More uncertainty with points and unknown rewards will mean very few will stake the token IMHO. People want certainty. Allocate a certain number of tokens to be paid as daily rewards and leave it at that. That’s how bybit did it for the launch of DBR, it was simple and popular. And stakers got rewards quickly. This bull cycle will be over in 12 months or less. Reward those hodlers who stick around for a few more years.

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Hey Henri! Thanks for the support and questions.

To touch upon what you sent over:
Slashing – Good input on the real-time visibility part. We are certainly looking to provide open and transparent real-time information to our community members especially when it comes to specific voting on certain proposals including any potential future slashing penalties for validators. This is definitely something we will be looking into.

Today, validators’ progress can be tracked in the deExplorer:

All validators also have a Telegram notification system set that sends them automated messages about any potential messages they missed. We can probably make that system public and start measuring publicly some validators’ stats like: validation time delay for each chain, number of missed transactions, etc.

Points – The point system is already live and it’s currently season 2. Season 1 of the points campaign concluded with an airdrop where 6% of the total supply was distributed proportionally to all point owners based on their score. In general, it can be viewed as an overall loyalty program that accounts points for different activities (for season 1 it was fees paid to the deBridge protocol, and the idea is to explore other areas such as staking) that add positive value to the deBridge ecosystem.

More details are available here:

Staking economics – We foresee that being something we discuss and decide upon in the DAO after we set the overall framework for the governance and staking and also after doing research of what others protocols have done. Protocol fees are definitely something where DAO can set through voting.

Happy to hear you think it offers a good foundation for the deBridge ecosystem. There are a lot of things to work on and get in place, and we really think this will be an invaluable part.

3 Likes
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Hey! Thanks for the message.

This approach is quite simplistic and is based on existing points loyalty program, which proved to be an efficient framework based on Season 1 results.

Important notes to have in mind: deBridge staking is different and unique in various ways compared to others as we’re dealing with cross-chain messaging and other components including economic security, which is why it’s important to evaluate these different areas and make sure we build a secure, efficient, and reliable staking process for the ecosystem. This is very different from e.g. Bybit launchpool, and not really comparable per say.

We’re building for the long-run and we’re looking to build a fully sustainable protocol for all deBridge stakeholders including users, integrators, community members, stakers, and others.

Users who don’t stake will not be able to participate in governance votings nor receive deBridge Season 2 points for staking (meaning that those who staked will have bigger weight in Season 2 distribution)

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Hey Marino!

Yes, DAO decides on what % should be allocated for each season.

The deBridge token distribution is designed to maintain an equal balance between the key groups of stakeholders: core contributors, strategic partners, and the community — all of which have an equally important role to the success of deBridge. The goal of the deBridge DAO is to make sure this balance is maintained for the long-term as tokens are getting unlocked over the next 3.5 years.

Everyone can see their point balances in the header of the deBridge app, plus it’s reflected in the deExplorer leaderboard with detailed stats:

Points are accumulated for fees paid to deBridge for:

  • Liquidity transfers
  • Message transfers
  • For IaaS subscriptions

Referrals bringing traffic to deBridge app through referral links and integration partners who leverage deBridge API, Widget, or interact with deBridge smart contracts accrue 25% of points from the total amount of points generated by their users.

Token holders who stake DBR to participate in governance get points accounted.

Users who stake DBR and other liquid assets for validators to enable crypto-economic security guarantees receive points as well.

This blog post describes mechanics of the points campaign in detail: